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The Paradox of Implicit Bias
and a Plea for a New Narrative
By
Michael Selmi 1

Abstract
Over the last decade, implicit bias has emerged as the primary explanation for contemporary
discrimination. The idea behind the concept of implicit bias, which is closely connected to the
well-known Implicit Association Test (“IAT”), is that many people are unaware of the biases that
influence their actions and can engage in discriminatory acts without any conscious intent. Legal
scholars have fallen hard for implicit bias and dozens of articles have been written espousing the
role implicit bias plays in perpetuating inequality. Within legal analysis, a common mantra has
arisen that defines implicit bias as unconscious, pervasive and uncontrollable. What has been
overlooked, however, and this is the paradox, is that labeling nearly all contemporary
discrimination as implicit and unconscious is likely to place that behavior beyond legal reach. And
it turns out that most of what is defined as implicit bias could just as easily be defined as explicit
or conscious bias. This article, therefore, challenges the common narrative by questioning the
unconscious nature of implicit bias, and showing that such bias is less pervasive and more
controllable than typically asserted. A critical review of the IAT will also reveal that implicit bias
is most relevant to snap judgments rather than the more common deliberative decisions the legal
system addresses. Implicit bias can certainly influence conscious decisions but it rarely dictates
them. I will also discuss a recent spate of cases rejecting the implicit bias model to demonstrate
that there is a clear mismatch between the implicit bias narrative and our governing legal standards
of proof. As a way of realigning the narrative, I will propose that we move away from a focus on
the unconscious, and the IAT, to concentrate instead on field studies that document discrimination
in real world settings. In addition, by shifting the discussion to how stereotyping, without reference
to the unconscious, influences behavior and leads to discriminatory decisions we can return to
familiar judicial terrain as courts have been adjudicating claims involving stereotyping for decades.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Discrimination, it is widely acknowledged, has changed. It has become both less pervasive
and less overt. Indeed, the primary question about contemporary discrimination is just how much
it has changed – how much it has receded and how much it has evolved from overt bias to more
subtle forms of discrimination. Over the last decade, implicit bias has emerged as the primary
explanation for continued inequalities and within this emerging literature it often seems as if all
contemporary discrimination results from implicit biases. 2 The idea behind the concept of implicit
bias is that many people, often defined to include those who are well-intentioned, are unaware of
the biases that influence their actions and therefore discrimination can occur even when the person
does not intend any discriminatory treatment. 3 This concept will be defined more extensively
below but the basic message is that discrimination can occur without any conscious intent or even
awareness by the actor, and implicit bias is commonly equated with unconscious bias. 4 Implicit
bias has also penetrated popular culture with popular books, including a prominent discussion by
Malcolm Gladwell, newspaper articles touting widespread training on implicit bias, and implicit
bias even made an appearance in our most recent Presidential election. 5
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Within law, UCLA Professor Jerry Kang has been one of the most influential, and prolific, scholars focused on
implicit bias. He has likewise been an enthusiastic supporter of the Implicit Association Test (“IAT”), which is now
invariably linked to implicit bias within law. See, e.g, Jerry Kang, et al., Implicit Biases in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA
L. REV. 1124 (20012); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1491 (2005). Professor Justin Levinson
has also been an influential and prolific scholar, and supporter of the IAT. See IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS LAW
(J.D. Levinson & R.J. Smith eds. 2012); Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias,
Decisionmaking, and Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345 (2007). More recently Professor L. Song Richardson has
published a series of articles emphasizing the role implicit bias plays in the criminal justice system. See, e.g., L. Song
Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Implicit Racial Biases in Public Defender Triage, 122 YALE L.J. 2623 (2013); L.
Song Richardson, Police Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 87 IND. L.J. 1143 (2012); L. Song Richardson, Arrest
Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2035 (2011).
3
The popularizing of the term implicit bias is generally traced to the work of Anthony Greenwald and Mazharin
along with their frequent collaborator Brian Nosek. See MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD,
BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE (2013) (exploring and explaining implicit bias).
4
See Kang et al., supra note 2 [Courtroom].at 1129 (noting that “attitudes and stereotypes may also be implicit,
in the sense that they are not consciously accessible through introspection.”); Song & Goff, supra note – [Yale], at
2631 (“Implicit biases, once activated, influence many of our behaviors and judgments in ways we cannot consciously
access and often cannot control.”).
5
See Emily Bazelon, How “Bias” Went from a Psychological Observation to a Political Accusation, N.Y. TIMES
Mag., Oct. 18, 2016, available at ttps://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/23/magazine/how-bias-went-from-apsychological-observation-to-a-political-accusation.html?; MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING
WITHOUT THINKING 72-98 (2005). Shankar Vedantam also published a popular book on the subject and now is a
regular feature on NPR. See SHANKAR VEDANTAM, THE HIDDEN BRAIN: HOW OUR UNCONSCIOUS MINDS ELECT
PRESIDENTS, CONTROL MARKETS, WAGE WARS, AND SAVE OUR LIVES. An example of his podcast is Shankar
Vedantam, The Thumbprint of the Culture: Implicit Bias & Police Shootings, June 5, 2017, NPR, available at
http://www.npr.org/2017/06/05/531578107/the-thumbprint-of-the-culture-implicit-bias-and-police-shootings.
Companies, such as Google and Facebook have also very publicly implemented implicit bias training. See Favhood
Manjoo, Exposing Hidden Bias at Google, N.Y. TIMES, September 24, 2014. Facebook’s training can be viewed at
ttps://managingbias.fb.com.
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Implicit bias has had a particularly strong pull among legal academics and in the last
decade, articles espousing the prevalence of implicit bias have proliferated. 6 Implicit bias, in other
words is everywhere, and that is part of the problem. Within the legal literature, Implicit bias is
commonly defined as unconscious, pervasive and beyond one’s control. 7 This is a message,
however, that can be difficult to reconcile with our governing legal standards of proof, which often
turn on one’s ability to control his behavior. As many scholars have argued over the years, our
legal system struggles to address unconscious bias 8 but this is a message that has been missed by
the recent onslaught of implicit bias enthusiasm, which treats all discrimination as originating from
implicit bias even when that label seems overbroad and inappropriate. Although implicit bias may
explain some of what we see as discrimination today, it does not explain everything.
Let’s consider one of the most well-known studies documenting discriminatory treatment.
In response to actual job advertisements, two economists sent out resumes that were identical in
content except for the names. 9 Some of the resumes had what the authors defined as identifiably
black names while others had what were deemed identifiably white names. The resumes that
contained white names received twice as many callback interviews as those with black names. 10
This study has gained great renown and prompted a number of similar studies all of which produce
similar results. 11 This and other resume studies likely demonstrate classic disparate treatment
discrimination --- two individuals identically situated are treated differently with the only
difference between them being their race, and yet the study is routinely identified as involving
6
There are now dozens if not hundreds of law review articles emphasizing the role of implicit bias in a wide array
of activities. For a sampling of recent articles, but just a sampling, see Deborah L. Brake, The Shifting Sands of
Employment Discrimination: From Unjustified Impact to Disparate Treatment in Pregnancy and Pay, 105 GEO. L. J.
559 (2017) (discussing role of implicit bias in pregnancy and pay discrimination); Jason P. Nance, Student
Surveillance, Racial Inequalities, and Implicit Racial Bias, 66 EMORY L.J. 765 (2017) (student surveillance); Anna
Roberts, Regaining the Importance of the Defendant’s Testimony: Prior Conviction Impeachment and the Fight
Against Stereotyping, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 835 (2016) (role if implicit bias with prior conviction testimony); Victor D.
Quintanilla & Cheryl Kaiser, The Same-Actor Inference of Nondiscrimination: Moral Credentialing and the
Psychological Licensing of Bias, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 53 (2016) (role of implicit bias in employment discrimination
doctrine); Nicole E. Negoretti, Implicit Bias and the Legal Profession’s Diversity Crisis: A Call for Self-Reflection,
15 NEV. L.J. 930 (2015) (diversity within law firms); Kristin Henning, Criminalizing Normal Adolescent Behavior
in Communities of Color: The Role of Prosecutor’s in Juvenile Justice Reform, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 383 (2013)
(discussing how implicit stereotypes affect juvenile offenders).
7
This issue will be discussed in more detail in section II.B. For one example District Court Judge Mark Bennett,
who has commented extensively on implicit bias defines it as “pervasive,” and falling outside of people’s awareness
and often difficult to control. See Judge Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury
Selection: The Problem of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4
HARV. L. & POL’Y. RVW. 151, 153 (2010).
8
Oddly enough, this was the message of the initial and well-known article that sparked interest in the connection
between antidiscrimination law and the unconscious. See Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (criticizing the intent requirement of
Equal Protection doctrine for failing to address unconscious bias).
9
See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal?
A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AMER. ECON. REV. 991 (2004).
10
Id. at 997-98.
11
I will return to these studies in section III, infra. For one recent example see Michael Ewens, Bryan Tomlin &
Lian Choon-Wang, Statistical Discrimination or Prejudice? A Large Sample Field Experiment, 96 RVW. OF ECON.
& STATISTICS 119 (2014) (study based on Craigslist ads for housing demonstrated that those with African-American
sounding names received fewer positive responses than those with white-sounding names).
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implicit bias. 12 But is there any reason to conclude that implicit bias explains the results? Surely
most of those who chose the white over the black candidate would deny that race played any role
in their decision but that has never been the standard, at least in law, for defining explicit or
intentional discrimination. It also seems particularly strange to label the behavior of a disparate
and unconnected group to a single cause – implicit bias – as presumably some of the individuals
involved in the study were likely motivated by express bias, others a more complex
decisionmaking process where their conscious decision was influenced by implicit or unconscious
bias, most likely in the form of negative stereotypes. Whether the individuals were aware of their
stereotypes is something, in the abstract, we cannot know and should not be assumed. Others in
the study may have been acting on the basis of bias they were truly unaware of, what is now defined
as implicit bias. But there is no reason to rush to judgment by labelling the disparities as the
product of implicit bias, and it is not at all clear why we would want to do so.
Additional examples are easy to come by. Implicit bias is often relied on to explain actions
of police officers who stop and search African Americans more commonly than whites but there
again is no particular reason to believe that police officers are unaware of their actions, or unaware
of the race of the individual. 13 Police officers will almost certainly deny any racial motive but that
denial does not mean that implicit bias explains their actions. Or take the current phenomenon of
“mansplaining,” where a man deigns to explain the obvious to a woman. Should that be considered
a form of explicit or implicit bias? Again, the man will deny any intent to condescend, and might
even point out that he has a sister or a daughter, but there is no reason to think that the person is
unaware of what he is doing. 14 It may be that he is unaware of why he is doing it but as I will
discuss in more detail, that by itself, should not mean that the behavior is unconscious. When we
ask whether these behaviors should be described as explicit or implicit, the answer should be that
it could be either, or both, and will depend, at least in part, on how the terms implicit and explicit
are defined.
This article challenges the common narrative that contemporary discrimination is the
product of implicit bias that is automatic, unconscious, pervasive and beyond one’s control, and I
will suggest that although the implicit bias literature is designed to make the legal system more
receptive to bias, it has likely had the opposite effect. Defining contemporary discrimination as
unconscious and beyond one’s control is not just inaccurate descriptively but it makes such bias
more difficult to prove. For example, extensive social psychology research has demonstrated that
what is defined as implicit bias can be controlled in any number of ways, which also indicates that

12

See, e.g., Jerry Kang, supra note --- [Trojan Horses] (discussing study as reflecting implicit bias); Justin D.
Levinson, Implicit Bias, supra note ___ [Misremembering], at 359 (noting that resume study reflects implicit
attitudes); Victor D. Quintanilla & Cheryl Kaiser, supra note ___ [The Same-Actor Inference] at 53 (discussing the
study in the context of implicit bias).
13
See L. Song Richardson, supra note __ [Minn.], at 2039 (“In the policing context, implicit stereotypes can cause
an officer who harbors no racial animosity to unintentionally treat individuals differently based solely upon their
physical appearance.”).
14
For what is likely to become a classic example of mansplaining see the effort of fledgling entrepreneur Erlich
Bachman explain what mansplaining is to two women who are venture capitalists, which can be viewed at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eyC_NKEz62A.
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it is not unconscious at least in the way that term is typically used. 15 Rather than defining implicit
bias as unconscious and uncontrollable, I will suggest that it should be treated as one step, usually
the initial step, in a more elaborate deliberative process. 16 Implicit bias has its greatest effect on
spontaneous decisions but plays a lesser role on the more common deliberative decisions. And
how we label the behavior matters. Courts have long had difficulty addressing unconscious bias,
which is most commonly identified with the controversial disparate impact theory where proof of
intent is not required. 17 More recently, courts have begun to reject expert testimony regarding
implicit bias, in large part because the general message that it is pervasive and unconscious is
difficult to square with traditional notions of legal proof. 18
The legal literature that emphasizes implicit bias to explain contemporary discrimination
has also oddly, and I am tempted to say inadvertently, returned us to an era when there were two
kinds of discrimination. There is overt discrimination sometimes referred to as animus or oldfashioned discrimination, which is equated with explicit bias, and then there is unconscious or
implicit bias. 19 But it is very strange to claim that if discrimination is not animus-based it must be
unconscious in nature. That just seems wrong and legal doctrines of proof have been adjudicating
subtle discrimination without reference to unconscious bias for more than forty years. 20 As such,
the current rigid dichotomy between explicit and implicit bias seems a peculiarly inapt description
of contemporary discrimination. One reason for this is that within social psychology explicit bias
means something different than it does within law. Social psychology defines explicit bias as
individual self-reports, what in law would be the equivalent of an admission or confession of bias,
something that is, needless to say, not common. It is surely a mistake to conclude that all
discrimination lacking a confession arises from unconscious forces.
This relates to how I believe the narrative should be changed. When most legal scholars
discuss implicit bias, what they generally mean is not that the bias is unconscious but that much
of discrimination occurs through stereotyping – the police officer who sees young black men and
quickly associates them with criminal activity, the employer who looks at a woman’s resume and
15

The issue of controlling implicit bias is discussed in section III.A. For a comprehensive review see Nilanjana
Dasgupta, Implicit Attitudes and Beliefs Adapt to Situations: A Decade of Research on the Malleability of Implicit
Prejudice, Stereotypes, and the Self-Concept, 47 ADVANCES IN EXPER. SOC. PSYCH. 233 (2013).
16
See, e.g., Michael A. Olson & Russell H. Fazio, Reducing Automatically Activated Racial Prejudice Through
Implicit Evaluative Conditioning, 32 PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 421, 421(2006) (noting that “racial prejudices are
often so well learned that they are activated automatically upon encountering a member of a relevant groups and
become the first piece of input on the path toward discriminatory behavior.”)
17
In a recent case applying the disparate impact theory to a federal housing statute, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that the disparate impact theory could be used for “counter[acting] unconscious prejudice.” Texas
Dept. of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2511-12 (2015). See also Reva B.
Siegel, Race-Conscious But Race-neutral, The Constitutionality of Disparate Impact in the Roberts Court, 66 Ala. L.
Rev. 653, 667 (2014) (identifying the disparate impact theory with uncovering “hidden and unconscious
discrimination.”).
18
This issue is discussed in section II.B.2.
19
In an early book on discrimination post-Civil Rights Act, the author divided discrimination into two very similar
categories “old-fashioned” racism and “aversive” racism, which has much in common with implicit bias. See JOEL
KOVEL, WHITE RACISM: A PSYCHOHISTORY 54 (1970).
20
The well-known McDonnell-Douglas structure of proof applicable to employment discrimination claims was
designed to address “subtle discrimination” based on circumstantial evidence. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green. 411 U.S. 792, 795 (1973) (“Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise.”).
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assumes she will leave the workforce when she has children, or a school principal who reacts
differently to behavior by African American students than white students. These behaviors are
influenced by unconscious attitudes but the behavior itself is deliberative and intentional and fits
easily within standard legal doctrines. Just as courts have been adjudicating claims of subtle
discrimination for decades, they have also been establishing liability based on claims of
stereotyping for just as long, and shifting the focus away from implicit bias and to stereotyping
will align the social psychology research with existing legal standards of proof. 21
At this point, I should make clear that my critique differs, and in some ways is the opposite
of, the existing criticism of implicit bias as measured by the Implicit Association Test (“IAT”).
The IAT is the most widely used measure of implicit bias and is what has captured the attention
of legal scholars and more recently the public as proof that implicit bias permeates our society.
The IAT relies on rapid response to various primes such as pictures of African Americans and it
has been repeatedly demonstrated that whites, and often Asians, are quicker to associate African
Americans with negative words than they are for whites. This will be discussed in more detail
below but the test has proved controversial and has been subjected to strong criticism by a band of
dedicated scholars. 22 This criticism has recently bled over into the public domain with a nasty turn
between the creators of the IAT and its critics. 23 My critique is quite different. I accept that
implicit bias is a real and useful concept, and have long discussed its role in contemporary
discrimination though I typically prefer to use the term subtle discrimination to avoid the link to
the unconscious. 24 The point I want to emphasize is that the recent enthusiasm among legal
scholars for the concept of implicit bias is largely based on a misunderstanding of the theory that
leads to labelling behavior as implicit that could just as easily be described as explicit, and by
doing so, much of contemporary discrimination is likely to evade legal liability.
This article will proceed in the following way. The first section will analyze and critique
the IAT, which within law is seen in tandem with implicit bias. In other words, for legal scholars,
implicit bias is tied to the IAT, and I will demonstrate that the test has limited predictive ability.
21

A reference to stereotyping appeared, in a concurring opinion, in the very first case the Supreme Court
adjudicated under Title VII. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(quoting EEOC guidelines that it was impermissible to refuse “to hire an individual based on stereotyped
characterizations of the sexes.”).
22
See F.L. Oswald, Gregory Mitchell, Hal Blanton, J. Jacord & Phillip Tetlock, Predicting Ethnic and Racial
Discrimination: A Meta-Analysis of IAT Criterion Studies, 105 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 171 (2013); Gregory
Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023 (2006).
Although this group of scholars have been the most active critics, others have also questioned the validity and utility
of the IAT. See, e.g., Miguel C. Brendl, Arthur B. Marksman & Claude Messmer, How Do Indirect Measures of
Evaluation Work? Evaluating the Inference of Prejudice in the Implicit Association Test, 81 J. OF PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCH. 760 (2001) (concluding that it is not possible to infer a single cause from IAT results).
23
There have recently been two lengthy critiques of the IAT and by association, implicit bias, in the popular press.
See Tom Barlett, Can We Really Measure Implicit Bias? Maybe Not, THE CHRONICLE RVW, Jan. 27, 2017, at B6;
Jesse Singal, Psychology’s Favorite Tool for Measuring Racism Isn’t Up for the Job, NEW YORK MAGAZINE, Jan. 11,
2017, available at nymag.com/scienceofus/2017/01/pyschologys-racism-measuring-tool-isn’t-up-to-the-job.html.
The Singal article, which is lengthy and offers a sophisticated analysis, chronicles the name-calling and nasty
interactions between the various parties.
24
See Michael Selmi, Subtle Discrimination: A Matter of Perspective Rather than Intent, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. Rev. 657 (2003).
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The next section will critique the emphasis on the unconscious and the pervasiveness of implicit
bias before illustrating how courts have struggled to accept discrimination claims based on implicit
bias. The final section will first demonstrate that implicit bias, however defined, can be controlled
with a wide variety of interventions, and I will suggest that rather than focusing on social
psychology studies, we turn our sights to the increasing volume of field studies that document
discriminatory practices in the real world rather than in the lab. Finally, I will urge a return to a
focus on stereotyping to move away from emphasizing the unconscious nature of contemporary
bias.
II. DEFINING AND CRITIQUING IMPLICIT BIAS
The concept of implicit bias is rather straightforward, although it can also be difficult to
define with specificity. Implicit bias is the term now used to define biases that an individual is
generally thought to be unaware of. As psychologists have long explained, individuals are often
motivated by unconscious thoughts, and they are often unable or unwilling to acknowledge the
influence of those thoughts. 25 This concept is not new and has roots in psychoanalysis, and indeed,
the initial exploration within the legal literature of the role of unconscious thoughts as they related
to race discrimination were steeped in a Freudian analysis. 26
A. The Implicit Association Test and Implicit Bias.
What is different about the recent turn to implicit bias is the measurement tool. In the late
1990s, a group of social psychologists developed a test known as the Implicit Association Test,
better known as the IAT, to measure implicit biases. 27 The test, which is conducted on line and
has been taken in various formats by millions of individuals, requires a rapid response to a series
of pictures and words. A test taker is shown a series of pictures of African Americans, or whites,
often well-known individuals, and is required to associate the pictures with a set of words, some
of which are seen as positive and others as negative. 28 Because the test requires rapid response
measured in milliseconds, test takers do not have time to filter their thoughts and the associations
are said to reflect their implicit (or unconscious) rather than explicit (conscious) biases. 29 The test
calculates a score for each test taker and classifies them into one of four categories ranging from
25

For a discussion see FRANK TALLIS, HIDDEN MINDS: A HISTORY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS (2002).
The seminal article by Professor Charles Lawrence, certainly one of the most famous law review articles ever
written involving discrimination, was steeped in an analysis of the unconscious. See Lawrence, supra note __.
27
The IAT was originally created in 1998 and has been modified over time, including to cover topics beyond the
original black-white paradigm. For a discussion by its creators at its inception see Anthony Greenwald, D. McGhee
& J. Schwartz, Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. OF
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1464 (1998).
28
The test is described in BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note __ [Blindspot], at 39. The founders of the IAT
provide a detailed discussion in Brian A. Nosek, Anthony Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Implicit Association
Test at Age 7: A Methodological and Conceptual Review, 265, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY & THE UNCONSCIOUS: THE
AUTOMATICITY OF HIGHER MENTAL PROCESSES (J.A. Bargh ed., 2007). For a helpful explanation of the test within
the law review literature see R. Richard Banks, Jennifer L. Eberhardt & Lee Ross, Discrimination and Implicit Bias
in a Racially Unequal Society, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1182-1183 (2006).
29
BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note [Blindspot] at 39.
26
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no bias to high bias, and the results demonstrate that most white individuals more rapidly associate
negative words with African Americans and positive words with whites. 30 Similar tests are
available for other social categories, including age, gender and sexuality but most of the research
centers on the race IAT. 31 The key insight is that the vast majority of people who take the test,
upwards of 75%, achieve scores that indicate a prominent level of implicit bias, which has led to
the frequent refrain that we all hold implicit biases or unconscious stereotypes. 32
With the exception of a small group of critics, 33 the IAT has been enthusiastically embraced
by legal scholars who commonly see the IAT as documenting “implicit bias . . . that originates in
unconscious mental processes that systematically distort the way we see other people.” 34 In similar
statements, the IAT is said to provide evidence that biases are unconscious, pervasive and difficult
if not impossible to control. 35 It is often noted that there is a sharp divergence between bias
measured by the IAT and by explicit measures, making the IAT something like a lie detector,
documenting bias even in those who profess fidelity to norms of equality. In addition, legal
scholars frequently emphasize the IAT’s ability to predict real world behavior and to do so better
than explicit measures. 36
Outside of law, and in particular within the field of social psychology, the claims
regarding the IAT have been more tempered and recently the test has been the subject of
considerable public criticism. 37 As I mentioned previously, it is not my intention to join the band
of IAT critics but given the immense influence the test has had within legal scholarship, I think it
will be helpful to highlight some of its limitations. I should note that no one contests the primary

30

Id. at 46-47.
The test is available a https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/, and the website devoted to the test, including related
research is available at https://www.projectimplicit.net/index.html. It is not entirely clear how the scores that divide
the four categories are determined, and some claim that it was arbitrary. The results for the gender IAT are also
confusing in that women tend to show higher biases than men on some of the tests. For a discussion of these and other
issues see Gregory Mitchell and Philip E. Tetlock, Popularity as a Poor Proxy for Utility: The Case of Implicit
Prejudice 164, in PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE UNDER SCRUTINY (S.O. Lilienfeld & I.D. Waldman 2017).
32
BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note [Blindspot] at 47 (“[A]lmost 75 percent of those who take the Race IAT on
the internet or in laboratory studies reveal automatic White preference.”).
33
See citations in notes ___ supra. See also Gregory Mitchell, Second Thoughts, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 867
(2009); Amy L. Wax, The Discriminating Mind: Define It, Prove It, 40 CONN. L. REV. 979 (2008).
34
See Tanya Kateri Hernandez, One Path for “Post-Racial Employment Discrimination Cases – The Implicit
Association Test Research as Social Framework Evidence,” 32 LAW & INEQUALITY 309, 320 (2014).
35
See, e.g., Nance, supra note __ [Emory], at (defining implicit bias as arising “automatically, unintentionally,
and unconsciously”); Anna Roberts, supra note __, at 861 (“Implicit stereotypes can be defined as unconscious
associations between particular groups and particular traits”); Richardson, supra note __ [Minn.]. at 2042 (“Research
in the field of implicit social cognition repeatedly demonstrates that individuals of all races have nonconscious or
implicit biases that have behavioral consequences.”); Justin D. Levinson, supra note __ [Duke], at 359 (“Implicit
stereotypes manifest quickly and potentially harmfully in a variety of different ways, and that they do so automatically
any time there is a stereotype-consistent cognitive opportunity.”).
36
See, e.g., Benforado, supra note __ [Indiana], at 1364 (implicit bias can “predict social and organizationally
significant behavior.”); Jerry Kang et al, supra note __ [Courtroom], at 1130-31 (noting that the IAT “predicts certain
kinds of real world behaviors.”); Nance, supra note __ [Emory], at 822 (“Empirical evidence shows that white
preference measured by the IAT predicts discriminatory behavior even among people who hold egalitarian beliefs.”).
37
See note __, supra.
31
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finding that on the IAT a majority of white test takers demonstrate a preference for whites over
blacks, what is contested is what that means.
The main area of contention regarding the IAT is whether IAT scores predict actual
behavior. In other words, would knowing someone’s IAT score help determine whether they are
likely to act in discriminatory ways. The evidence on this question is both limited and mixed. A
significant number of studies have sought to demonstrate that those with high, or higher IAT,
scores are likely to engage in discriminatory decisionmaking, and the most common mechanism
to establish this connection is to have college students take the IAT and then perform some
evaluative act, such as reviewing resumes or a story about a legal trial. Obviously, these are not
actual decisions, but even in this laboratory setting, the most recent data demonstrate a very modest
connection between the IAT and behavior. 38 Indeed, even the founders of the IAT have recently
acknowledged the modest connection but they have also sought to demonstrate that among a large
number of decisions, even a modest connection can make a significant difference. 39 Maybe so,
but this defense seems highly unusual and would presumably apply to any frequent activity that is
associated with a weakly correlated test. Moreover, a recent working paper in which several of the
co-authors are affiliated with the IAT, including one of the founders, found “little to no evidence”
that changes in implicit bias led to changes in either behavior or explicit bias, again suggesting a
weak link between implicit bias scores and behavior. 40
One area where the IAT has thought to provide significant evidence of predictive behavior
has to do with what is known as shooting bias. 41 Over the last two decades, a number of studies

38

A recent meta-analysis, a method that evaluates findings across studies, found that the IAT was a poor predictor
of behavior. See F. Oswald et al., Predicting Ethnic and Racial Discrimination: A Meta-Analysis of IAT Criterion
Studies, 105 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 171 (2013). Several of the authors of the meta-analysis are the
primary critics of the IAT, which may taint the study in the eyes of IAT defenders even though this study was peerreviewed and subsequently acknowledged by the IAT founders. For a similar analysis see Rickard Carlsson & Jens
Agerstrom, A Closer Look at the Discrimination Outcomes in the IAT, 57 SCANDANAVIAN J. OF PYSCHOLOGY, 278
(2016).
39
See Anthony G. Greenwald, Mahzarin R. Banaji & Brian A. Nosek, Statistically Small Effects of the Implicit
Bias Test Can Have Societally Large Effects, 108 J. OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCH. 553 (2014). Much of the
article seeks to explain differences in the results of meta-analyses regarding the predictive ability of the IAT but goes
on to note that even low level correlations can result in “significant cumulative impact of very small acts of
discrimination.” Id. at 559.
40
See Patrick S. Forschner et al., A Meta-Analysis of Change in Implicit Bias, working paper, May 5, 2016,
available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/308926636_A_Meta-Analysis_of_Change_in_Implicit_Bias.
Although the authors found that “implicit bias can be changed across many areas of study,” they also found that those
changes did not affect explicit bias. They wrote, “Most surprising is the fact that we found little to no evidence that
the changes caused by procedures on explicit bias behavior are mediated by changes in implicit bias.” Working Paper
at 34. Two of the authors, Patrick Forschner and Calvin Lai, are affiliated with Project Implicit and another author,
Brian Nosek, was one of the founders of the IAT.
41
The shooter bias studies have frequently been cited by legal scholars as evidence that the IAT predicts behavior.
See, e.g., Kenneth Lawson, Police Shootings of Black Men and Implicit Racial Bias: Can’t We All Just Get Along?,
37 HAWAII L. REV. 339, 361 (2015) (noting that studies demonstrate “that the race/color of the suspect is a factor
when officers make the decision to shoot”); Jerry Kang et al., supra note at 1138-39 [Courtroom] (while
acknowledging mixed results in published studies the authors conclude “we have evidence that suggests that implicit
biases could well influence various aspects of policing”); Natalie Bucciarelli Pederson, A Legal Framework for
Uncovering Implicit Bias, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 97, 108 (2010) (discussing and relying on a shooter bias study); L. Song
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have been conducted, both on students and police officers, to determine whether police officers
are more likely to shoot black defendants. The early studies would flash pictures with objects
some of which were guns while others were benign objects such as a wrench or a phone, and these
studies demonstrated that students and police officers were more likely to identify the benign
objects as a gun when it was held by a black individual. 42 But other studies reached different
conclusions, including an interesting study in Denver where the police performed better than
community members on the test, and were able to modify their behavior after receiving
instructions. 43 More recent studies have likewise cast doubt on the strong version of a shooter bias
noting that the findings of the earlier studies had not been replicated. 44 In addition, a recent study
by economist Roland Fryer based on data from Houston has suggested that police officers shoot
African Americans less frequently than white offenders. 45
I do not mean to suggest that the evidence conclusively refutes the claim of shooter bias or
the link to implicit bias; rather I only want to highlight how the legal literature has largely
overlooked the conflicting data. Equally important, even if one accepts that there is a shooter bias,
there is no clear reason to conclude that the bias is implicit rather than explicit. In an important
Richardson, Police Efficiency & the Fourth Amendment, 87 IND. L. J. 1143, 1170-71 (2012) (discussing shooter bias
studies).
42
One of the most influential early studies involved two different studies in which black and white faces were
flashed before an object. In the study where officers were under no time pressure, they accurately assessed whether
the object was a gun or an innocent object, like a wrench, though they were generally quicker to identify a gun when
a black face was flashed. In the second study where the officer was required to make snap judgments, they were more
likely to misidentify the innocent object as a gun when a black face was shown. B. Keith Payne, Prejudice &
Perception: The Role of Automatic and Controlled Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon, 81 J. OF PERSONALITY AND
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 181 (2001). The same author later conducted a similar test adding in IAT test scores and found
that individuals with higher negative implicit bias towards blacks had a higher weapon bias. The studies are discussed
and summarized in B. Keith Payne, Weapon Bias: Split-Second Decisions and Unintended Stereotyping, 15 CURRENT
DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 287, 287-88 (2006).
43
See Joshua Correll et al., Across the Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 92 J.
OF PERSONALITY AND SOCI. PSYCH. 1006 (2007) (finding that while officers were quick to engage in stereotyped
observations of African Americans their ultimate decision to shoot was not affected by stereotypes).
44
In a more detailed study that focused on more than just race, taking into account other factors such as
neighborhoods that influence officers’ decisions, the authors concluded: “Although prior shooter bias research . . .
often emphasizes the tendency to mistakenly shoot unarmed Black suspects more than unarmed White suspects, no
such pattern arose in our work. Although our findings are potentially encouraging, within the broader literature, the
evidence as to whether officers display a race bias in their shooting errors is decidedly mixed.” William T. L. Cox et
al, Toward a Comprehensive Understanding of Officers’ Shooting Decisions: No Simply Answers to This Complex
Problem, 36 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 356, 362 (2014). The authors went on to note, “The accumulating
evidence suggests that a wide range of personal and situational factors may affect these split-second shooting
decisions.” Id. Another meta-analysis of shooter studies recently came to a slightly different conclusion, namely that
study participants were quicker to shoot armed black targets but slower to shoot unarmed black targets relative to
white targets. See Yara Mekawi & Konrad Bresin, Is the Evidence from Racial Bias Shooting Task Studies A Smoking
Gun? Results from a Meta-Analysis, 61 J. OF EXPER. SOC. PSYCH. 120 (2015).
45
See Roland G. Fryer, Jr., An Empirical Analysis of Racial Differences in Police Use of Force, NBER Working
Paper No. 22399 (July 2016), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w22399.pdf. The paper generated substantial
press and criticism. For a balanced discussion of both the attention and criticism see Daniel Engber, Was this Study
Even Peer-Reviewed? How Journalists Should Write About Unpublished Research, SLATE, July 25, 2016, available
at
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2016/07/roland_fryer_s_research_on_racial_bias_in_polic
ing_wasn_t_peer_reviewed.html
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article on the Trayvon Martin shooting – a teenage boy killed by a self-proclaimed keeper of the
peace who was later acquitted for his act – my colleague Cynthia Lee writes, “It is unlikely that
George Zimmerman (the shooter) set out that night intending to kill a Black person, but implicit
bias likely influenced him to see Martin as someone who looked suspicious and dangerous.” 46 The
first part of her statement seems certainly true – it is unlikely that Zimmerman began his evening
with the intent to kill a black person. But from there it is all up to interpretation. This was not a
random or unintended act, and I would suggest that it was not an unconscious one either. More
likely, Zimmerman associated African Americans, and in particular young African Americans,
with criminality, and if one were to ask him and receive an honest answer, Zimmerman would
have admitted his bias. So although he did not set out to kill a black person, when he encountered
a black person that evening, his beliefs translated into a wrongful shooting because he assumed
the teenager was engaging in criminal activity. This may have been based on what is defined as
an implicit bias, but it may just as have likely been the product of explicit bias and even more
likely some combination of the two. Equally clear, we simply cannot know what motivated the
action absent some clear access into his heart or mind, which we do not have. The implicit bias
literature suggests that Zimmerman may not have access to that information either, may not be
able to access his unconscious beliefs, but again, that is a matter of interpretation, we simply cannot
know definitively and we certainly should not take his denials of racial intent as an accurate
representation of his thoughts.
In addition to the shooter bias studies, there is one particular study that is frequently cited
by legal scholars regarding the predictive ability of the IAT and this study does seem to reflect
implicit bias. The study asked doctors to evaluate patient files with the race of the patient as the
only distinguishing characteristic among the various files. The doctors also took the IAT and those
with higher IAT scores provided more aggressive care to white than black patients, even though
they more frequently diagnosed African Americans with a serious heart condition. 47 It is difficult
to understand this study without relying on implicit bias as there does not seem to be any obvious
reason why doctors would consciously provide inferior care to African Americans. Other studies
have documented similar biases in medical treatment and these studies involving actual doctors
provide valuable insight into the workings of implicit bias but by themselves the medical studies
do not demonstrate a broader link between the IAT and behavior. 48

46

Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not Yet Post-Racial Society, 91 N.C.
L. REV. 1555, 1577 (2013) (footnote omitted).
47
See Alexander R. Green et al., Implicit Bias Among Physicians and Its Prediction of Thrombolysis Decisions for
Black and White Patients, 22 INTERNAL MED. 1231 (2007).
48
See, e.g., Lisa Cooper et al., The Association of Clinicians’ Implicit Attitudes and Race With Medical Visit
Communication and Patient Ratings of Interpersonal Care, 102 AMER. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 979 (2012) (higher IAT
scores associated with providing worse care to black patients as well as the perception among those clients that they
had worse care). There have been a significant number of studies involving doctors, some of which observe actual
patient interactions and others rely on prepared case histories. Many of the studies are discussed in John F. Dovidio,
Samuel L. Gaertner & Tamar Saguy, Color-Blindness and Commonalty: Included but Invisible?, 59 AMER.
BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 1518, 1523 (2015) (noting that studies have shown a less willingness to prescribe pain
medication to black patients, as well as shorter and less successful visits).
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At this point, the evidence linking the IAT to actual behavior seems inconclusive at best.
Some scholars have hypothesized that one reason for this is that the IAT may just be measuring
cultural stereotypes that people might be familiar with because of their prevalence. 49 If true, there
might be less of a reason to expect people would act on the stereotypes reflected in their IAT
scores. Indeed, some have suggested just the opposite might be true, namely that the IAT may
trigger sympathetic portrayals of African Americans, that individuals taking the IAT might just be
reacting to pervasive media stereotypes with which they disagree. 50 The point here is that the
enthusiastic embrace by legal scholars of the broad implications of the IAT seem misplaced and
are often based on a limited review of the social psychology literature. Most scholars have likewise
failed to grapple with the distinction between explicit and implicit bias, an issue to which I will
now turn.

B. The Legal Mismatch of Implicit Bias.
The literature on implicit bias, particularly as interpreted in legal scholarship, provides
three dominant messages. Implicit bias is said to be unconscious, pervasive and difficult if not
impossible to control.51 Each of these messages proves problematic for legal analysis, in part
because social psychology and the law define implicit bias differently, and I will also show that
the broad claims advanced by many implicit bias advocates are generally inaccurate.
1. Explicit v. Implicit Bias.
Within social psychology, implicit bias is defined by its contrast, namely explicit bias, a
distinction that does not translate well into the legal landscape. Within legal analysis, explicit bias
is typically associated with conscious bias, intentional acts of discrimination. Unconscious bias,

49

See Hal Arkes & Philip E. Tetlock, Attributions of Implicit Prejudice, or “Would Jessie Jackson ‘Fail’ the
Implicit Association Test?” 15 PSYCH. INQUIRY 257, 265-66 (2004) (discussing possibility that IAT is picking up
cultural stereotypes rather than individual attitudes).
50
See Michael R. Andreychik & Michael J. Gill, Do Negative Implicit Associations Indicate Negatives Attitudes?
Social Explanations Moderate whether Ostensible “Negative” Associations are Prejudice-Based or Empathy-Based,
48 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 1082 (2012) (suggesting that among some test takers “what is automatically
activated in their minds by an African American prime is an empathy-based attitude . . .”).
51
See L. Song Richardson, Cognitive Bias, Police Character, and the Fourth Amendment, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 267,
271 (2012) (describing implicit bias as “non-conscious” and “typically, unable to control.”); Justin D. Levinson, supra
note ___ [Duke], at 359 (“implicit stereotypes manifest quickly and potentially harmfully in a variety of different
ways, and that they do so automatically any time there is a stereotype-consistent cognitive opportunity.”); Anthony
Page, Unconscious Stereotyping & the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 185-90 (2005) (defining implicit
attitudes as “unconscious” and defying “conscious control”); Nance, supra note __ [Student Surveillance], at 819
(defining implicit bias as “automatically, unintentionally, and unconscionably” invoked); Anthony Benforado, supra
note __ [Indiana], at 1363 (“Implicit biases are automatic associations held by individuals often beyond their conscious
awareness or control.”).
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on the other hand, has long been associated with the disparate impact theory, which does not
require proof of intent. 52 This is not how social psychology defines explicit and implicit bias.
Within social psychology, the distinction between implicit and explicit biases arises from
self-reported attitudes. As a measure of explicit bias, individuals are asked to record their values
or beliefs regarding equality and biases, and these self-reported results are then defined as
representing someone’s explicit beliefs. As the authors of one study explain: “In a typical study
. . . a sample of research volunteers is compared on two tests of racial attitudes. One test is explicit,
asking them to report their attitudes on a questionnaire. The other test is implicit. Rather than
asking for a self-report, it uses performance on another task to reveal attitudes.” 53 Needless to say,
this is not what the legal system means by explicit bias, given that these self-reports are the legal
equivalent of a confession. 54
It should, therefore, come as no surprise that these self-reports show high levels of belief
in racial or gender equality and low levels of explicit bias. 55 To complete the analytical model, it
is the divergence between self-reported beliefs and the recorded associations with the IAT, or other
implicit measurement tools, that are then defined as implicit biases. People hold beliefs steeped
in stereotypes despite their self-proclaimed attachment to issues of equality – or more colloquially,
they say one thing and do another, which is one definition of implicit bias.
This latter issue – the measurement of explicit beliefs – has received less scrutiny than the
focus on implicit beliefs, particularly within the legal literature. 56 Yet, whether the self-reported
beliefs are accurate measures of explicit bias raises important issues regarding the nature of
“implicit beliefs” and may also prove important to the extent the distinction between implicit and
explicit beliefs are invoked in legal proceedings. As has been well documented, self-reported
attitudes often reflect social norms rather than actual attitudes. 57 Indeed, this was the central reason
52
See sources cited in notes __ supra. For an additional discussion as applied to employment discrimination see
ONTIVEROS, ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE
252-54 (9th ed. 2016) (discussing issue disparate impact law and lack of intent requirement).
53
B. Keith Payne, Melissa A. Burkley, Mark B. Stokes, Why Do Implicit and Explicit Attitude Tests Diverge? The
Role of Structural Fit, 94 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 16, 16 (2008). See also Bertram Gawronski et al.,
Temporal Stability of Implicit and Explicit Measures: A Longitudinal Analysis, 43 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL.
300 (2016) (relying on questionnaires as a measure of explicit bias); John F. Dovidio, Kerry Kawakami & Samuel L.
Gaertner, Implicit and Explicit Prejudice and Interracial Interaction, 82 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 62, 63
(2002) (equating explicit bias with “self-reported prejudice”).
54
The closest analogue the legal system has is what is defined as “direct evidence” in employment discrimination,
namely clear evidence, often involving epithets, of discrimination. See, e.g., Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858,
865 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[D]irect evidence of discrimination does not require a factfinder to draw any inferences in order
to conclude that the challenged employment action was motivated at least in part by prejudice against members of the
protected group.”)
55
See, e.g., Roberts, (Re)forming the Jury: Detection and Disinfection of Implicit Juror Bias, 44 CONN. L. REV.
827, 834 (2012) (“Levels of implicit bias frequently conflict with self-reported attitudes, usually because emplicit
measures show no bias while implicit measures show bias.”).
56
A notable exception is Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias Matter?
Law, Politics, & Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053, 1058-59 (2009).
57
See, e.g.,Christain s. Crandall, Mark A. Ferguson, Angela J.Bahns, When We See Prejudice: The Normative
Window and Social Change, 53, 63, in STEREOTYPING AND PREJUDICE (C. Stangor & C. Crandall eds. 2013) (“People
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for the move towards measuring implicit attitudes, namely that self-reported attitudes were thought
to be unreliable as an indicator of actual beliefs. 58
Within social psychology, this has been a widely-recognized phenomenon going back to
the 1970s when national norms regarding racial bias began to evolve. 59 Back then, social
psychologists began to devise a series of experiments to investigate whether people’s stated racial
beliefs were consistent with their actions. Early studies involved someone dropping a bag of
groceries to see whether anyone would come to help, and these studies demonstrated that people
were more likely to assist members of their own race. 60 Contemporary implicit measurement tools
are essentially an extension of these earlier studies, though the results are now interpreted
differently with a focus on how the implicit measurements reveal unconscious biases. 61 This
assumption seems far less appropriate if the explicit measures are unreliable.
When individuals are asked to state their beliefs on issues of racial or gender equality, it is
widely accepted that they may be reluctant to express feelings that would be identified as racist or
sexist in nature. 62 Within voting circles, this common sentiment even has a name -- “the Bradley
effect” named in response to the defeat of African-American candidate Tom Bradley for governor
of California. In that race, which occurred in 1982, the public opinion polls showed Bradley
winning by a wide margin, although the anonymous voting booths proved inconsistent with voters’
only report having prejudices that are normatively acceptable.”); Charles S. Crandall, Amy Eshleman & Laurie
O’Brien, Social Norms and the Expression and Suppression of Prejudice: The Struggle for Internalization, 82 J. OF
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 359, 363 (2002) (“People will report their own prejudice according to how much it is
socially acceptable.”).
58
See Russell H. Fazio et al., Variability in Automatic Activation as an Unobtrusive Measure of Racial Attitudes:
A Bona Fide Pipeline?, 69 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1013, 1014 (1995) (explaining that the unreliability of
“self-reported attitudes” is what “motivated pleas for use or more indirect unobtrusive measures of racial attitudes”).
See also David Faigman, Nilanjana Dasgupta & Cecilia Ridgeway, The Law of Discrimination and the Science of
Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1389, 1407 (2008) (“Doubts about the accuracy of self-reflection and the honesty of
self-reports prompted social psychologists to seek alternative means of identifying motivating factors that influences
people’s attitudes, beliefs and behaviors.”).
59
See Harold Sigall & Richard Page, Current Stereotypes: A Little Fading, A Little Faking, 19 J. PERS. & SOC.
PSYCH. 247 (1971)
60
These and other early studies are discussed in Faye Crosby, Stehanie Bromley & Leonard Saxe, Recent
Unobtrusive Studies of Black & White Discrimination and Prejudice: A Literature Review, 87 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL.
546, 549 (1980).
61
For a discussion of the history of implicit measurement tools see B. Keith Payne & Bertram Gawronski, A
History of Implicit Social Cognition: Where is it Coming From? Where is it Now? Where is it Going?, in HANDBOOK
OF IMPLICIT SOCIAL COGNITION: MEASUREMENT, THEORY & APPLICATIONS 1-14 (2010).
62
This is a widely accepted phenomenon: “It is easy for people to edit what they say and to conceal their true
attitudes and opinions. Many factors affect people’s willingness to express their true attitudes, especially when it
comes to prejudices and so motivate socially desirable responding.” BERNARD E. WHITLEY JR. & MARY E. KITE, THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION 63 (2010); Brian Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and Correlates of
Implicit Attitudes and Stereotypes, 18 EUROPEAN RVW. OF SOC. PSYCH. 36, 58 (2007) (“[A] variety of perspectives
converge on the notion that because of egalitarian norms, people’s reports of social preferences will be weaker than
what is revealed by implicit measures like the IAT.”); Bertram Gawronski & Jan de Houwer, Implicit Measures in
Social and Personality, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL AND PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY, 283-308
(2014) (“[R]esearchers are well aware that people are sometimes unwilling or unable to provide accurate reports of
their own psychological attributes. In socially sensitive domains . . . responses on self-report measures are often
distorted by social desirability and self-presentation concerns.”).
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stated preferences. 63 The concern within the psychology field is the same – people’s stated beliefs
may not accurately represent their views on issues relating to equality. Although the unreliability
of self-reported attitudes is widely known, the effect on whether we label beliefs as implicit or
explicit is just as widely overlooked, again particularly in the legal literature. 64
Indeed, the entire force of the implicit bias literature turns on the fact is that people’s
actions reflect more bias than their stated preferences with the additional message that people are
often unaware of these implicit biases and unable to control them. This message might be different
if we saw implicit measurement as consistent with explicit beliefs, at least in some instances.
Indeed, I certainly do not mean to suggest that what is labelled as implicit bias is invariably a form
of explicit bias only that there is likely a greater overlap than is typically assumed. In other words,
people may not be more biased than they realize but that they are more biased than they are willing
to admit. If that is the case, there is no obvious reason why such bias would be labelled implicit
rather than explicit., and implicit bias measures would thus be revealing concealed beliefs rather
than unconscious ones.
There is considerable evidence to support this possibility. One way of getting at this
question is to assess whether implicit and explicit biases are closely correlated. Although it has
generally been assumed that there is a divergence between the two, that is not always the case. For
example, a comprehensive review of published studies found that measures of the IAT and explicit
self-reports “are systematically related to one another.” 65 Another review found that the
differences between explicit and implicit biases are often a function of how the tests are
structured. 66 Professor Anthony Greenwald, one of the founders of the IAT, and his colleagues
have also concluded that implicit and explicit attitudes tend to be more highly correlated when
there is “less motivation to disguise their attitudes on explicit measures.” 67 Consistent with this
view, people are more willing to express explicit preferences for thin individuals and negative
63
For a discussion of the Bradley effect and its relevance to the 2008 election of President Barak Obama see Nate
Silver, If the Bradley Effect is Gone, What Happened To It? FiveThirtyEight (Oct. 13, 2008)
http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/if-bradley-effect-is-gone-what-happened/.
64
Several legal scholars, although recognizing the potential problem with explicit reports, proceed to treat them as
accurate. For example, after noting that self -reports may not be accurate Jerry Kang later notes that “I may honestly
self-report positive attitudes toward one social category . . . “ Kang, supra note __ [Trojan], at 1507 and 1513.
Similarly, Gregory Parks and Jeffrey Rachlinksi initially acknowledge that “individuals may not reveal their true
attitudes or preferences because of social desirability biases” but then later assume explicit reports are accurate
“explicit norms . . . reflect only the slower deductive processes.” Gregory S. Parks & Jeffery Rachlinksi, Implicit
Bias, Election ’08, and the Myth of Post-Racial America, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 659, 684-86 (2010).
65
See Wilhelm Hoffman, et al., A Meta-Analysis on the Correlation Between the Implicit Association Test and
Explicit Self-Report Measures, 31 PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 1369, 1382 (2005). The authors went on to
note: “These results challenge the assumption that explicitly and implicitly assessed representations are completely
disassociated and that correlations between the two are purely random.” Id.
66
See B. Keith Payne, Melissa A. Burkley and Mark B. Stokes, Why Do Implicit and Explicit Attitude Tests
Diverge? The Role of Structural Fit, 94 J. OF PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCH. 16 (2008). The authors explained:
“Sometimes differences between test structures are mistaken for differences between implicit and explicit thought.
We suggested one means of equating test structures to solve that problem. When the tests were equated, much of the
divergence between them evaporated, leaving implicit and explicit tests highly correlated.” Id. at 30.
67
Anthony Greenwald et al.,, A Unified Theory of Implicit Attitudes, Stereotypes, Self-Esteem and Self-Concept,
10 PSYCHOLOGICAL RVW. 3, 18 (2002).
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preferences for Muslims. 68 Similar findings were documented for age where people were
generally willing to express a preference for younger individuals. 69 In these areas, the social norms
are not as strong as they are for race or gender discrimination, and it also appears that those who
are less concerned about social norms against racial discrimination, such as some conservatives,
are more willing to state their biases explicitly. 70
All of this suggests what is defined as implicit bias, even within social psychology, might
in many instances just as well be labelled as explicit bias. Probably the best way to reconcile these
findings is to rely on a categorization advanced by a group of social psychologists some years ago.
Under this schema, there is (1) a group of individuals who are truly nonprejudiced and do not
obtain high scores on implicit measures; (2) a group of individuals who are willing to express their
prejudice on self-reports and then (3) a group of individuals for whom there is a difference between
their explicit and implicit measurements, with this group broken down further into a group for
whom implicit bias is truly revealing something the individual is unaware of, as is typically
asserted, while for another group their explicit bias reports are affected by social norms against
bias. 71 It might also be that one’s unconscious, or implicit, thoughts influence conscious actions,
making it difficult to know how to classify such behavior. The practical problem, and one that has
particular force within a legal system is we simply cannot know who falls into which category.
It may be that the focus on the unreliability of explicit measures may not make as much of
a difference within psychology where the primary focus is on on documenting the pervasiveness
of bias. But within law, the distinction between explicit and implicit bias may prove the difference
between a finding of liability and no liability. And therein lies the problem – if the observed
behavior, whether of an employer, a police officer or some other entity or person, is defined as
implicit and unconscious, the law will have a much more difficult time attaching liability. 72
Relatedly, the emphasis on how implicit bias is automatic or uncontrollable may make it less likely
that someone will be held liable for behavior that arises from implicit attitudes. This issue will be
discussed in more detail in the next section but there is little question that some scholars, and it
appears courts as well, conclude that individuals should not be held responsible for behavior they
cannot control. 73 This is why the decision to label discriminatory behavior as the product of
implicit bias turns out to be so important and again highlights another critical difference between
68

See Nosek et al., supra note ___ [European Review], at 58-59 (noting that “explicit preferences for thin people
compared to fat people slightly exceeded implicit thin preferences, and explicit preferences for other people compared
to Arab-Muslims exceeded implicit preferences.”).
69
Id. [Nosek], at 62.
70
Id. at 79.
71
See Fazio et al, supra note --- [Variability in Automatic Activation], at 1025.
72
Many legal scholars have sought to find ways to incorporate unconscious behavior into legal structures of proof.
See, e.g., Brake, supra note __ [Georgetown], at 571 (noting that proof structures are designed “to search for a
conscious intent by the decision maker.”). See also Patrick Shin, Liability for Unconscious Discrimination? A Thought
Experiment in the Thoery of Emp. Discrim. Law, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 67 (2010) Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact:
Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911 (2005); Melissa Hart, Subjective
Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrim., 56 ALA. L. REV. 741 (2005).
73
See, e.g., Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129 (1999) (arguing that employers should
not be held responsible for behavior they cannot control).
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how implicit bias is used within social psychology and law. Social psychology is not concerned
with how labelling attitudes can fit within governing legal principles but is instead primarily
concerned with educating the public on the presence and operation of discrimination.
2. Implicit Bias and the Unconscious.
Even though implicit bias has been equated with unconscious bias in law reviews dozens
if not hundreds of times, there has been very little effort to explain the link, why it is that implicit
bias is defined as unconscious bias. The connection with the unconscious arose early on when
Professors Greenwald and Banaji defined implicit bias as incapable of “introspection” in large part
because based on explicit self-reports it was presumed that individuals were unaware of their
implicit attitudes.74 Since then, especially in the law review literature, it is has simply been
assumed that implicit bias is unconscious in nature. But we have already seen that is not always
true, that people may be more aware of their implicit bias than originally thought, and we will also
shortly see that they can frequently control whatever implicit bias they may have, providing
additional evidence of at least some conscious awareness. A recent study also indicated that
implicit bias appears to be less stable over time than explicit bias suggesting that implicit biases
may not be deeply rooted in past experience. 75 In any event, it is worth exploring what it means
to label behavior as unconscious.
Indeed, it is not always clear what is meant by labelling implicit bias as unconscious.
Sometimes the discussions of implicit bias, particularly those that emphasize its unconscious
nature, make it seem like we are sleepwalking through life, unable to control or direct our actions,
unaware of just what we desire or more accurately how to achieve those desires. This is, in part,
the mental image that arises when people say that implicit bias is automatic and uncontrollable.
At the same, time no one actually supports this caricature and it seems a more limited meaning is
appropriate.
By unconscious what is meant is that the actor is unaware of her underlying motives or
rationale. 76 Take the example of a human resources officer who hires a white man over a
demonstrably better qualified African-American man. When asked why he did so, under the
74
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implicit bias theory, the individual would honestly proffer a race-neutral rationale and when
pressed, would actually be unaware that race played a role in his decision. The same could be said
of the police officer who elects to search an African American but not a white individual who has
been pulled over. At the risk of repetition, it should be pointed out that when the individual denies
a racial motive, as they always do in the context of litigation, we cannot know if she is being honest
or whether she is simply and consciously concealing her own discrimination. It also might be the
case that although the person was truly unaware of the operational bias, with a little effort she may
have been able to access that bias, in other words, it need not be any all or nothing proposition. 77
By using these illustrations, we can also see why implicit bias, as measured by the IAT, may
not seem like a particularly good predictor of real-world behavior. By design, the IAT requires
instantaneous decisions and response times are measured in milliseconds. Very few real-world
activities, however, occur in that way. Most, but not all, are the product of deliberation and a
number of scholars have emphasized that explicit bias measures likely provide more accurate
predictors of deliberate behavior than implicit bias, which is more closely connected to
spontaneous behavior. 78 This idea is well established and is generally referred to as a “dual
process” or “dual attitudes” theory. 79 These theories have much in common with the more recent
popular work of Daniel Kahneman, a psychologist who has been a hugely influential force within
behavioral economics. Professor Kahneman divides thought into what he labels System 1 and
System 2, with the former representing a fast and automatic thought process and the latter
involving effortful or deliberate thoughts. 80
Within the dual process theory, what we think of as implicit and unconscious bias would likely
only play a limited role in deliberative decisions and would have its strongest influence on
decisions that must be made without the benefit of time for deliberation or reflection. This might
include a police officer’s decision to shoot, and might also explain, at least in part, why police
officers are so frequently exonerated for their shootings even in the rare instance when they are
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calculates.”).
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indicted. 81 Implicit bias would have less of a role in most employment decisions, cases of school
discipline (though perhaps not the initial decision to seek discipline), voting, police searches or
other more deliberative decisions.
The behavioral economics literature offers two important insights that help distinguish that
work from some of the implicit bias scholarship. First, although the two systems are seen as
distinctive, they are also interrelated. System Two can intervene to correct or prevent errors in
System One thinking but by the same measure System Two is not flawless, it may also be affected
by unconscious biases (stereotypes) that lead to systematic errors. 82 And System One is not
invariably flawed. More often than not, System One will work just fine as the unconscious
processes will lead to a suitable decision and serve primarily as convenient heuristic devices or
shortcuts to help us navigate our daily lives. After all, one reason we judge books by their covers
is because we cannot read them all but we do read some, and very few people are likely to make
their decision based solely on the cover. The emphasis on how the two systems can work together
is important and provides a better picture of how we actually make decisions. A review essay
nicely captures the integrated approach by explaining: “[Explicit attitudes result from considering
various pieces of information that come to mind, weighing them against each other, and creating
consistency among them. Implicit attitude is one piece of the information that plays a variable role
in the process.” 83
Second, and equally important, no one within behavioral economics would contend that all of
our thoughts are the result of System 1 thinking whereas it often seems, at least in the legal
literature, that implicit bias explains all or most contemporary discrimination. Seeing the two
systems as distinct but interrelated provides further evidence that the social psychology definition
– which sees explicit and implicit bias as entirely distinct since one is self-reported and the other
is measured indirectly – translates poorly into the legal arena.
There are additional reasons to question whether implicit biases are inherently unconscious.
One important reason, which will be discussed further shortly, is that there is broad consensus that
implicit biases can be controlled, suggesting they are not inevitably beyond our conscious
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awareness. 84 An interesting recent study also demonstrated that people were able to predict their
implicit bias scores even when they had very different explicit bias reports. 85 The authors of the
study interpreted the results to mean that “our participants had some awareness of their implicit
attitudes.” 86 An earlier study also indicated that self-reports reflected more bias when the
participants were under the impression that inaccurate self-reports could be detected by the
examiner. 87 The presence of a black examiner also reduced implicit bias, indicating that
participants may have been able to access their implicit thoughts. 88
So even though it is commonplace within legal scholarship to refer to implicit bias as
unconscious, there is reason to contest this label, particularly when it comes to actual behavior as
opposed to the snap judgments required by implicit bias measurements. There is also little question
that within law it matters tremendously if a behavior is defined as unconscious. In employment
discrimination, the disparate impact theory, where unconscious bias is typically pursued, is not
only difficult to succeed on but is generally reserved for class action cases. 89 Criminal law and
tort law both treat behavior that is beyond one’s control or unconscious differently than if it were
conscious behavior. 90
Similarly, outside of legal responsibility, unconscious bias is often seen as difficult to square
with principles of moral responsibility. Within philosophy, there has been a recent surge of interest
in the moral responsibility that attaches to implicit biases. Capturing the general consensus,
Jennifer Saul has stated, “A person should not be blamed for an implicit bias that they are
completely unaware of,” and adds, “Even once they become aware that they are likely to have
implicit biases, they do not instantly become able to control their biases, and so they should not be
blamed for them.” 91
This intuitive sense has been validated in a study where students were presented with
discrimination scenarios and in some of those scenarios they were told that the discrimination
resulted from implicit bias that was automatic and uncontrollable. The study participants who
84
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were told that the discrimination was attributable to implicit bias rendered judgments that were far
more lenient than those on which the discrimination was not described as unconscious. As the
authors of the study explained, “Having a theory or implicit race bias to explain discriminatory
behavior significantly reduced judgments of moral responsibility.” 92 Aware of this problem,
several philosophers have recently crafted arguments in favor of moral responsibility by focusing
on the ability to control or anticipate the behavior even when it is automatic in nature. 93 Legal
scholars, however, have largely ignored these issues altogether without acknowledging that
labelling behavior as implicit, unconscious, automatic and uncontrollable is likely to take the
behavior out of the realm of both legal liability and moral responsibility.
3. The Pervasiveness of Implicit Bias.
Another central aspect of the implicit bias literature is that it is pervasive, that implicit bias
affects all of us, and is not simply the product of a few bad apples. As previously mentioned, on
the IAT, it is estimated that upwards of 75% of whites register scores indicating high levels of bias
against blacks. 94 A recent Pew Research study among a different sample found that 48% of whites
had a preference for whites over blacks and 45% of black respondents favored blacks over
whites. 95 The study also indicated that the IAT scores of 25% of whites demonstrated a preference
for blacks, with the remaining group defined as neutral. 96 Within the legal literature and the media,
these results are taken to mean that most people harbor biases. 97
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As is true with the emphasis on the unconscious, emphasizing the prevalence of implicit bias
can be difficult to reconcile with the legal system, where discrimination is typically seen as an
anomaly rather than the norm. It is also difficult to reconcile with the notion that discrimination
has receded over the last three decades, particularly when implicit bias is said to predict actual
behavior. The seventy-five percent figure is actually much higher than the percentage of people
who opposed Brown v. Board of Education shortly after the decision was decided or interracial
marriage in the 1960s. 98 One way to harmonize these figures would be to suggest that implicit
bias is less problematic than overt bias but that is not typically the message of the implicit literature
nor is it consistent with the emphasis on how the IAT predicts behavior. On the whole, the
prevalence of implicit bias in the real world seems like a tough and unnecessary sell – unnecessary
because it is simply not necessary to rely so heavily on the concept of implicit bias to describe the
presence of contemporary discrimination.
With this in mind, there seems to be a strategic objective underlying the emphasis on the
prevalence of implicit bias, one that has a lengthy pedigree within law. My sense is that there is a
sentiment among implicit bias advocates that soft-pedaling the discrimination message by
suggesting how common it is will lead to a greater willingness to change. This is ultimately an
empirical question and there is no clear evidence to support the claim, and experience under the
disparate impact theory has not shown companies are more willing to change their practices in
light of a disparate impact claim than a disparate treatment, or intentional discrimination,
claim. 99 In fact, if anything, the opposite seems to be true, as companies appear to respond more
quickly to claims of intentional discrimination especially when those claims reflect overt
discrimination. We have seen this recently with a spate of quick corporate reactions to claims of
sexual harassment where companies have paid out large settlements and fired prominent figures
to stem the tide of negative publicity. 100
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Where the message that discrimination is in all of us has had its greatest impact is with
companies that opt for training, and implicit bias training has become a staple within many
companies, police departments and other entities. 101 This seems certainly to be a positive
development as the training should provide insight into the nature of contemporary discrimination
that too many are still lacking. Depending on how the training is conducted, it also seems likely
to differ from the controversial diversity training that previously swept through corporate America
to limited effect. 102 For other companies, those less interested in change, the message regarding
the depths of implicit bias could have the opposite effect: implicit bias is so common, so prevalent,
that it becomes too difficult to root out, it is just a social phenomenon that is largely beyond our
control. 103 Indeed there are already concerns that the general message that implicit bias cannot be
controlled may limit its effectiveness. 104
There is an important distinction between relying on implicit bias for educational purposes and
for litigation. As reflected in a recent spate of cases, the generic implicit bias message -- that it is
unconscious, automatic, uncontrollable and pervasive -- has been mostly ineffective.

4. Implicit Bias in the Courts.
Although the cases remain few in number, over the last several years the concept of implicit
bias has found its way into a number of courts, often as an explanation for observed disparities.
The high-profile Supreme Court case involving claims of sex discrimination against Wal-Mart is
certainly the most prominent case in which the concept, though not the term, was explored and
share company Uber recently fired 20 employees as a result of a high-profile investigation into the culture of the
company. See Eric Newcomer, Uber Fires More than 20 Employees in Harassment Probe, BLOOMBERG NEWS, June
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decisively rejected. 105 Several other lower court cases have also rejected the use of implicit bias
theories to prove discrimination, often in the form of excluding the testimony of expert witnesses
proferred to testify regarding the prevalence of implicit bias.
The Wal-Mart case involved allegations of classwide discrimination in pay and promotions in
stores across the country. Central to the plaintiffs’ claims was expert testimony by sociologist
William Bielby who sought to explain the operation of contemporary sex discrimination. Bielby’s
testimony, sometimes referred to as social framework evidence, was designed to show that many
of the discretionary employment systems instituted by Wal-Mart were vulnerable to
discrimination. 106 As part of that argument, Bielby relied on evidence relating to implicit bias to
claim that discrimination need not be explicit or overt to influence employment systems. The
testimony, which was only partially related to implicit bias, was discussed briefly by the Supreme
Court and resoundingly rejected. The problem, the Court noted, was that the testimony could not
prove more than that Wal-Mart’s systems were vulnerable to discrimination, which is all that such
testimony can prove adding, “Bielby’s testimony does nothing to advance respondents’ case.” 107
The same turns out to be true with implicit bias, and this is an aspect of the mismatch that has
been overlooked by legal scholars. As a matter of proof, there is little available response to a
claim of implicit bias. When someone is accused on engaging in implicit bias, in searching a
suspect or in hiring a white over a black man, there is no available denial because any denial would
be steeped in unconscious bias. One might be able to contest the very concept, which is what one
finds in some of the criticisms, but absent attacking the concept, little refutation is available. This
goes back to the moral responsibility point raised earlier – while advocates of implicit bias may
think it will lead to greater findings of liability, the reality is more likely the opposite, that it will
lead to more exonerations or a collective judicial shrug if we are all prone to implicit bias that we
cannot control.
Indeed, something along these lines appears to explain several recent cases in which courts
rejected outright the attempt to introduce evidence relating to implicit bias. Over the last few
years, plaintiffs have increasingly sought to introduce expert testimony relating to how implicit
bias can influence decisionmaking but courts have often been skeptical about the breadth of the
arguments. For example, in a class action race discrimination case brought against the YMCA to
challenge their pay and promotion practices, a district court excluded the testimony of Professor
and IAT founder Anthony Greenwald because it proved too much. Adopting the magistrate’s
initial recommendation that the testimony be excluded, the District Court described Greenwald’s
testimony as not just suggesting that implicit bias “might” affect the process but “he opines that
105
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‘implicit or hidden biases . . . are now established as causes of adverse impact that is likely
unintended and of which perpetrators are likely unaware.’” 108 The court went on to note that this
testimony could be extended to any setting where disparities were observed:
“In other words, unless the evidence to the contrary is ‘clear,’ Dr. Greenwald
maintains that it is ‘more likely than not’ that implicit discriminatory bias
accounts for any disparity between the treatment of African Americans and other
racial groups.” 109
On this basis, the court excluded the testimony as speculative and lacking a scientific basis. 110
In another race discrimination case brought in Iowa state court to challenge the state’s process
for making executive-level decisions, while permitting the expert testimony of Dr. Greenwald and
sociologist Cheryl Kaiser, the court ultimately discounted the persuasive force of the testimony.
One problem such testimony continues to run into is that the experts do not typically have any
specific evidence regarding bias by the particular defendant, in this case by those who were making
the hiring decisions in Iowa. As a result, the testimony is generic in nature and could be applied
to any workplace, even those that were seeking to address the potential of discrimination. As the
state District Court noted, “Under Dr. Greenwald’s opinion, even in the best-case scenario, with
the screening manual followed, bias could still unconsciously invade the process.” 111 The Court
was equally concerned regarding the breadth of Professor Kasier’s testimony: “Dr. Kaiser holds
the view that implicit bias is so pervasive that any merit-based employment system merely serves
to legitimate inequality. This is because the system gives the perception of being fair, when, in
fact, the inevitable presence of implicit bias dictates that it cannot be.” 112
It is obviously difficult to know what to do with that kind of testimony since it is entirely
unrelated to the particular workplace involved in the case and could mean that discrimination
would be established anytime racial, or other, disparities were proven. Indeed, this is how the
Iowa court interpreted the testimony: “Both social scientists seem to operate from the assumption
that every three out of four subjective discretionary decisions made in the State’s hiring process
were the result of, or tainted by, an unconscious state of mind adverse to African-Americans.”113
The court ultimately concluded that the implicit bias testimony “does not prove causation.” 114 For
similar reasons, Dr. Greenwald’s testimony was recently excluded in a complicated age
discrimination case brought under the disparate impact theory. 115 As an interesting twist to the
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case, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s analysis of the disparate impact theory for
applying the wrong legal standard but affirmed the exclusion of the expert testimony, which the
district court had excluded because it was “not based on sufficient facts or data” and was “not the
product of reliable methods.” 116
The combination of the pervasiveness and unconscious nature of implicit bias has made it a
difficult argument for many, though certainly not all, courts, to accept. To be sure, a number of
courts have permitted and relied on the evidence in employment discrimination claims. 117 The
theory has also been used to challenge the constitutionality of state death penalties and found
support primarily through concurring opinions. 118 Similarly, in another recent case from Iowa,
although the Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s decision not to provide a jury instruction on
implicit bias in a criminal case, several concurring Justices argued that such an instruction should
be permissible or even mandatory. 119
On the whole, the combination of the pervasive and unconscious nature of discrimination,
along with the ill-defined definition of what it means to label the bias as unconscious, has created
a serious mismatch between the legal structures of proof and the implicit bias literature. There is
a separate question that needs to be addressed. Accepting these criticisms as they are to suggest
that there is a clear mismatch between the concept of implicit bias as defined within social
psychology and relevant legal standards, what if the analysis of implicit bias is true? What if
upwards of 75% of whites are biased, at least implicitly, against African Americans? Should the
law ignore the science simply because it is inconsistent with our legal standards? The answer to
that question has to be no, as the very best science challenges rather than confirms our existing
beliefs.
Yet, when we delve into the implicit bias literature, we do not find scientific findings as
typically defined. Rather, the concept of implicit bias is a label that has been applied to the results
116
Id. See Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 849 F.3d 61, 85 (3rd Cir. 2017) (affirming exclusion of expert
testimony while reversing the court’s analysis on the proper analysis of disparate impact theory). See also Childers
v. Trustees of the University of Pa., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35827 (Mar. 21, 2016, E.D. Pa.) (excluding expert
testimony relating to stereotypes relating to women in the workplace in a tenure case).
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v. Washington State DOT, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190352 (W.D. Wash.) (admitting expert testimony of Anthony
Greenwald); Kimble v. Wisconsin Dept. of Workforce Div., 690 F. Supp. 2d 765 (E.D. Wisc. 2010) (relying on theory
in race discrimination case apparently without benefit of expert testimony).
118
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purposeful, hateful racism or racial animus, but from these sorts of subtle, imperceptible biases on the part of generally
well-meaning decisions makers.” State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 1, 160 (Norcott, J., concurring) (2013). A dissenting
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of a measurement instrument. What we know is that upwards of 75% of whites more quickly
associate negative pictures with African Americans but we do not know why that is the case. The
measured bias might be due to unconscious attitudes but it might also be as a result of concealed
explicit bias. We also do not know whether those IAT results will translate into behavior –
whether, for example, police officers who score high on the IAT are more or less likely to shoot
or search an African American, or whether a decisionmaker in a company is more or less likely to
hire women as a result of his implicit bias (keeping in mind that what is called implicit bias might
be something entirely different). Even if we accept that these higher IAT scores can translate into
behavior, we do not know whether individuals can counteract their implicit biases by being more
deliberative, seeking collaboration, or learning more about how implicit bias operates.
What we do know, and where I think the emphasis should be, is that resumes sent out with
identifiably black names yield fewer call back interviews, as it also true for resumes that indicate
a woman is married. 120 We know that African-American boys are disciplined at far greater rates
than whites and often for the very same behavior that white students commit, and that African
Americans are searched after traffic stops at far higher rates than whites even though contraband
is found more commonly among whites who are searched. 121 And we know that there are rarely
any convincing race-neutral explanations for these disparities. As an employment discrimination
lawyer and advocate, I am confident I could prove that these disparities were the product of
intentional discrimination but if I label these actions as arising from implicit bias, I am equally
confident that, as a legal matter, they will more likely be found to be nondiscriminatory. I would
also suggest there is no reason to label any of this behavior as the product of implicit bias, we
simply do not know enough about the underlying actions or motives to conclude that implicit bias
best explains the actions, and under current legal frameworks, those motives are typically not
relevant.

III. CHANGING THE NARRATIVE
As I have argued throughout this article, the obsessive focus among legal academics on
implicit bias is neither helpful nor necessary. A new narrative is thus in order, and one that builds
on the implicit bias literature but seeks to capture the complexities of discrimination outside of the
binary world animated by implicit bias. This new narrative would have three components: (1) the
ability to control implicit bias, now well established, would become a central part of the analysis,
one that would effectively change the way implicit bias is commonly characterized within law; (2)
rather than focusing on the IAT, I would suggest that legal scholars pay more attention to field
120
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studies, such as the resume studies discussed earlier, without the necessary emphasis on implicit
or unconscious bias; (3) rather than focusing so heavily on implicit bias, I would urge scholars to
return to the earlier focus on stereotyping – which is, after all, what underlies most implicit bias
and is a more familiar concept both to courts and the general public. This changing narrative
would help move us away from the troublesome focus on the unconscious and the notion that
discrimination is omnipresent and can explain any observed disparities, of any kind.
A. Controlling Implicit Bias.
As noted earlier, an integral part of the legal analysis with respect to implicit bias is that
the bias is not just unconscious but largely uncontrollable. Scholars vary on just how
uncontrollable they consider implicit bias – some have recognized the scholarship documenting
an ability to control bias, while others will acknowledge that unconscious might be controllable
without devoting any significant attention to the issue. 122 This turns out to be a crucial issue, one
that is also relevant to the question whether it is necessary to define implicit bias as unconscious,
given the now considerable evidence that implicit bias can, in fact, be controlled.
Probably the most common claim is that those who are motivated to control prejudice are
likely to be able to control implicit bias. People might be motivated for internal reasons – they do
not want to engage in biased actions – or external reasons, namely that they do not want to appear
biased. 123 Under either scenario, personal motivation has often been shown to hold implicit bias
in check. 124 For example, a study involving judges found that, although many of the judges
demonstrated high levels of implicit bias on the IAT, they were also able to moderate that bias in
the judgments they rendered in mock trials. 125 This surely does not mean that motivated
individuals will always be able to control their bias, but it does mean that biases can often be
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A common statement or definition of implicit bias is: “Implicit biases are automatic associations held by
indiviudals often beyond their conscious awareness or control.” Adam Benforado, Frames of Injustice: The Bias We
Overlook, 85 IND. L.J. 1333, 1363 (2010) (citation omitted). Professor Benforado later acknowledges the possibility
of “conscious control” though he does not try to reconcile his previous statement. Id. at 1368-69. See also Negowetti,
supra note __ [Legal Profession], at 935 (“implicit biases influence many of our behaviors and judgments in ways we
cannot consciously access and often cannot control”); Richardson, supra note __ [Ariz. St.], at 271 (describing implicit
bias as “non-conscious” and “typically, unable to control”); Page, supra note __ [BU] (noting that unconscious bias
“[def[ies] conscious control” but later discussing ways to control.).,
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DISCRIMINATION, 265, 274-75 (ed. T. Nelson 2009) (motivated individuals are more likely to control implicit bias);
Russell H. Fazio & Michael A. Olson, Implicit Measures in Social Cognition Research, Their Meaning & Use, 54
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See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges? 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1195, 1221 (2009). Based on this study, the authors concluded, “[I]mplicit biases can translate into biased
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controlled. In the context of the Dual Process theories discussed earlier, we might think of this
control process as upon deliberation, type 2 process can override type 1 impulsive decision.
An important study involving jury deliberations demonstrated just how a desire to appear
unbiased to others, what is typically defined as an external motivation, can shape how people
deliberate. Professor Samuel Sommers conducted a series of mock jury trials with varied jury
compositions. The mock trials were extensive with videotaped testimony and trial transcripts
available to the jurors. The central conclusion of the study was that more diverse juries engaged
in more careful deliberation, reviewing more of the evidence and taking into account different
theories, and ultimately reached different verdicts from less diverse juries. 126 Perhaps the most
important insight from the study was that the more intense deliberation was not the result of
African American jurors contributing different perspectives but it was the result of white jurors
who acted differently, more conscious, in the presence of other diverse jurors, presumably because
they did not want to appear biased. 127
Other studies have also shown that people are likely to act in a less biased fashion when
they know their actions are subject to review or judgment. 128 For example, a study of baseball
umpires found that umpires were more likely to provide a favorable strike zone to pitchers of the
same race as the umpire, but the favoritism receded when the game was nationally televised where
the strike zone would be more closely monitored by the national audience. 129 And in the study
involving the provision of inferior cardiac care to African American patients that has caught the
attention of legal scholars and was discussed earlier, a group of the doctors who participated in the
study realized it was designed to measure racial bias and their care did not demonstrate any racial
bias. 130
One of the interesting aspects of the emphasis on motivation is that the group of people
who are most likely to want to control prejudice are those who underreport their own explicit biases
on self-reports as a way of concealing their prejudice. This group is also likely to have a significant
disconnect between their scores on something like the IAT and explicit bias self-reports so it is a
126
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group that, based on that disconnect, one might be particularly concerned about. 131 Yet, they may
also turn out to be the group most able to control their bias.
Another, and related, way to reduce implicit bias is by increasing awareness. Again, this
is not a simple proposition. Increasing awareness is likely to have the strongest effect on those
who are receptive to the notion that implicit bias is a real issue, and that discrimination remains a
pervasive societal force. In contrast, increasing awareness is likely to have little effect on those
who resist the very concept of implicit bias. 132
Two interesting studies involving basketball referees demonstrate the potential power of
awareness. A study authored by two economists found that basketball referees were more likely
to call fouls against players who were not of their race, so that white referees were more likely to
call fouls against African-American players. 133 The study generated substantial media attention,
including strong criticism from the National Basketball Association (“NBA”). 134 Following the
widespread attention, the authors conducted another study and found that the bias among referees
had all but disappeared. 135 This was true even though the NBA claimed it had not made any
changes to its practices and fouls in the middle of a fast-paced basketball game are precisely the
kind of instant decisions most likely to be influenced by implicit bias. 136 A recent study involving
medical school admissions officials found that having the officials take the IAT and then conduct
their admissions with their scores in mind produced a more diverse class than prior years. 137
Increasing awareness of implicit bias is obviously a central part of any educational or training
procedure, which are now widespread and are often provided by those who most strongly advocate
for the pervasive influence of implicit bias.
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Another educational strategy that has been demonstrated to be effective in reducing bias is
what is often labelled as contact theory – namely having diverse groups of individuals work or
interact together, similar to the Sommers study discussed previously. This has been a longstanding proposition within antidiscrimination scholarship and underlies much of the emphasis on
diversity over the last few decades. And it remains relevant, as studies continue to demonstrate
that “intergroup contact typically reduces intergroup prejudice.” 138 It is also the case that
providing positive counterstereotypes can help alter implicit bias. 139 Strategies that require
individuals to consider the perspective of others, in this instance someone of a different race or
gender, has also been demonstrated to combat automatic expressions of bias, as has providing
more individuating information. 140
I should be clear that the fact that implicit bias can often be controlled does not mean there
is an easy fix to reducing prejudice. If there were, it would have already been adopted. At the
same time, studies consistently show that implicit bias can be controlled and regulated, and that its
operation is not inevitable. 141 This is also consistent with what we observe in the social world
where the pervasiveness of bias as measured by the IAT does not translate into discriminatory
actions seventy-five percent of the time. Stereotype activation is not the same as stereotype
application. I suspect that one of the reasons people commonly refer to implicit biases as
uncontrollable has to do with the IAT, which is specifically designed to require rapid decisions so
that those decisions are beyond one’s control. But the mechanism of the IAT is not replicated for
most real world actions, and it is a mistake to confuse the lack of control of the IAT with the
controllability or malleability of implicit biases more generally.
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This also means that it may not be necessary to associate implicit bias with unconscious
actions or thoughts but it might be better to think of implicit bias as nondeliberative snap judgments
that can be moderated in a number of different ways. This, by itself, would be a significantly
different message than is typically conveyed by implicit bias advocates, and one that would seem
to better capture how we navigate our daily lives. 142 While it may be true that unconscious biases
lurk in many if not most of us, it is also true that those biases are commonly held in check, although
they may influence our deliberative actions at times.

B. The Importance of Field Studies.
One widely recognized limitation of much of the social psychology research on implicit
bias is that it typically involves college students in laboratory settings. Sometimes they are asked
for real world decisions such as to read a vignette about a trial and to make judgments about an
appropriate criminal sentence or to do mock hiring but as we saw with the earlier discussion, it is
often difficult to extrapolate the laboratory findings into real world settings where more is at stake
and the decisonmakers are likely to be more sophisticated. This does not mean that the social
psychology studies are meaningless; on the contrary, they have provided great insight into the
operation of discrimination and often in ways that would be very difficult to replicate in the real
world.
Nevertheless, field studies, where researchers seek to test their theories in actual settings
provide more compelling evidence of the pervasiveness of discrimination. These studies are most
commonly conducted by economists and sociologists, but variations exist within social psychology
such as the studies done with actual doctors and often actual medical patients. 143 Although legal
scholars have shown great affection for the IAT and the related concept of implicit bias, more
could be gained by shifting focus to field studies, which will also provide a better match with legal
cases.
As discussed earlier, one of the best, if not the best, known field study involved sending
out thousands of resumes in response to actual job postings and varying the names so that some of
the resumes had white-sounding names and others had African-American sounding names. 144 The
study documented that the resumes, which were identical other than on the names, with African-
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American soundings names resulted in fifty percent fewer callbacks. 145 Since that study was
published, there have been a substantial number of variations.
One recent study sent resumes to faculty members looking for lab assistants and
demonstrated that both male and female science faculty were less likely to hire a woman, and when
they did so, they generally offered a lower starting salary. 146 Another resume study documented
discrimination against women with children when the resume made it clear that the applicant was
a mother. 147 Inquiries to mortgage brokers seeking information regarding loans and on the loan
process found that those with African-American names received fewer responses and less
information when responses were received. 148
Recently the field studies have migrated to the internet, an area rife with potential to
document discrimination.
One study demonstrated that applicants with African-American
sounding names received fewer responses to their requests in response to apartment advertisements
on Craigslist. 149 A recent study replicated those results with Airbnb hosts where it was determined
in a study of 6,000 listings across 5 cities, that African-American guests received a positive
response to their requests roughly 42% of the time compared to a 50% response rate for white
guests. 150 And a study on Ebay auctions of baseball cards found that when the cards were held by
an African-American hand they sold for approximately 20% less than when they were held by a
white hand. 151 Some years ago Professor Ian Ayres, one of the authors of the baseball card study,
documented disparities in retail car negotiations where he found that women, and African
145
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Americans, often paid higher prices for cars and received less favorable financing terms than white
car buyers. 152
Sociologist Devah Prager, and her colleagues, have conducted several in-person audit
studies. These studies differ from the resume, or correspondence, studies in that two, or more,
applicants will appear in person to apply for jobs. The first study was focused on documenting the
impact of having a criminal record, which Professor Pager found was a significant deterrent to
finding a low-wage job. 153 For the purposes of this article, the most significant finding was that
the data showed that whites with criminal records had a better chance of getting a favorable
response from an employer than an African American without a criminal record. 154 African
Americans with criminal records were one-third as likely as whites with criminal records to receive
a favorable employer response. 155 A more recent study that focused on low-wage jobs in New
York City found that black applicants were half as likely to receive a positive response than
similarly situated white applicants. 156
The advantages to these field studies is that, when they are done correctly, they provide
powerful evidence of the presence of discrimination. These studies are specifically designed to
isolate race or gender in the decisionmaking process, and these audit studies rely on actual
decisionmakers rather than students or other volunteer participants. 157 A possible limitation of
these field experiments is that there is typically no basis for determining what underlies the
discriminatory treatment; for example, there is no means to determine whether the behavior was
the product of animus, unconscious bias, some combination of the two, or perhaps even a neutral
nondiscriminatory reason. In the context, of the original resume study focused on names, it has
been suggested that class bias rather than race might best explain the results. 158 In any event, the
results of these field studies require interpretation to determine whether discrimination underlies
the decisions.
But, and this is a critical point, the social psychology studies on implicit bias also require
interpretation. When those studies identify implicit bias as explaining the observed results, what
is meant is that the observed behavior differs from explicit self-reports, nothing more and nothing
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less. Those self-reports may indicate that some of the individuals were unaware of their implicit
biases but it is also possible, perhaps just as likely, that those self-reports are inaccurate or that
with some deliberation the individuals would be aware or have access to what is defined as implicit
bias. In the end, how that implicit bias is treated, or more accurately, how the results are explained,
will require interpretation, just as is true with the field experiments.
These real world examples may also provide additional evidence to refute the notion that
the bias is unconscious in nature. Surely no one would claim that an Airbnb host was compelled
to deny the request from a black guest or that the decision was uncontrollable. The same could be
said of the mortgage broker, the employer reviewing resumes, or a landlord responding to an
apartment rental request. Some of these individuals engaging in discriminatory activity are likely
motivated by old-fashioned racism, a desire not to associate with an African American. Others
are more likely acting on racial stereotypes, such as that an African American would prove to be
a bad guest, or will ultimately not qualify for a loan. For a variety of reasons these stereotypes
may not be reflected in a self-report but it seems highly unlikely, when we consider the actual
circumstances of the decisionmaking, that the individual is unaware of the presence of the
stereotype. They might try to rationalize it to themselves and others by arguing that their racial
stereotypes are statistically sound, what is often referred to as statistical discrimination. 159 Yet, it
would also be the case that their stereotypes were inaccurate and overbroad, and the use of
stereotypes in this fashion should be provable as intentional discrimination. 160 Moreover, it should
be possible to prove that discrimination without resorting to the implicit bias schema, and certainly
without seeking to explain whether the behavior is conscious or unconscious in nature. All that
needs to be proved under the law is that an individual was treated differently because of his race
or her gender; it is not necessary to prove why. 161
Along these lines, several recent important intentional discrimination cases were proved
without resort to implicit bias. Most significantly was a class-action case brought to challenge the
stop-and-frisk policy implemented by the City of New York, which a District Court judge struck
down as intentionally discriminatory. 162 Similarly, the voter identification laws in North Carolina
and Texas were recently struck down as intentionally discriminatory, and again, the courts never
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referred to implicit bias even though these were not cases of overt bias. 163 In investigating the
practices of the City of Ferguson Missouri, where Michael Brown was shot in 2014, the
Department of Justice concluded that the many of the City’s practices were infected with
intentional discrimination. The final report concluded that the City’s practices were intentionally
discriminatory as a result of some explicit overt bias as well as persistent stereotyping about
African Americans. 164 It is revealing that these circumstances – police stops and shootings, voter
identification laws – are precisely the kind of circumstances that advocates of implicit bias see as
involving unconscious discrimination. It seems equally clear that implicit bias is not necessary to
prove these claims, and as noted earlier in the discussion of moral responsibility, likely not
helpful. 165
I would also suggest that if we were able to translate the resume studies into legal cases,
most experienced attorneys, and likely inexperienced attorneys as well, would be able to prove a
claim of intentional discrimination.
The employer might raise other issues, such as the
socioeconomic issue relating to names arguing essentially they were worried about the class of the
individual rather than the race, but even then, an attorney would likely be able to link the
socioeconomic status to race. Surely there is no reason to believe that all African Americans are
poor, or of lower economic status, and looking at the resumes or the record, might demonstrate
that the employer’s argument is just a pretext for racial discrimination. In other circumstances, it
is difficult to see what nondiscriminatory rationale might be available. For example, an Airbnb
host who rejects all African American guests, as the study indicated many did, would presumably
have a hard time coming up with a race neutral reason. All transactions are processed with credit
cards so there is no clear socioeconomic rationale for rejecting the requests, and any other rationale
is likely to run right up against a racial explanation. Again, understanding why the host rejected
the requests is not necessary, one need only prove that race was the motivating cause. 166
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C. Return to Stereotyping.
The final modification of the existing narrative would involve a change in both language
and emphasis with respect to contemporary discrimination. The most important shift would be to
move away from focusing on the unconscious, which, for law, is the most problematic term. And
as has been discussed previously, there is simply no scientific reason to conclude that what is
defined as implicit bias invariably arises from the unconscious. Perhaps most important, as a legal
question, the issue turns out to be entirely irrelevant.
Dropping the focus on the unconscious would be an important step forward and it may be
facilitated by moving back to a concentration on stereotyping, a term that is more familiar and has
a lengthy history within the legal system. 167 Moreover, it is clear that, more often than not, what
scholars mean by implicit bias is that an individual is acting on an ingrained stereotype –
associating African Americans, for example, with criminality or women with children and a
likelihood to leave the workplace when they have children. Indeed, the founders of the IAT
routinely refer to implicit biases as stereotypes and have for many years. 168 Other social
psychologists likewise often use the terms interchangeably, as is also true for many legal
scholars. 169
To some, the switch to stereotyping may not seem particularly distinguishable given that
some scholars divide stereotyping into explicit and implicit realms. 170 It is not entirely clear what
is meant by an explicit stereotype, and examples are rarely given. It may be that an employer
concedes that he will not hire African American applicants because he assumes they are less
capable than whites, or he may also be willing to admit that he assumes that African Americans
are likely tied to criminal activity. Obviously, in the context of an actual legal case, it would be
highly unlikely that these sorts of statements would come to light and it is not at all clear that they
167
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should be treated as stereotypes as opposed to what might be called animus-based racism or overt
discrimination. 171
In addition to her audit studies, Devah Prager has interviewed employers to gauge their
attitudes and beliefs about race, and her findings were quite revealing. She noted that “one of the
most common themes we heard from employers centered on the perceived lack of a work ethic
among black men (fully 55 percent mentioned this issue,”) and she noted a common theme
surrounding the “perceived threatening or criminal demeanor” of black men. 172 Certainly there is
nothing implicit about these beliefs and perhaps they should be classified as explicit stereotyping.
Regardless of what they are called, as a legal matter it would not be at all difficult to establish
intentional discrimination based on these statements, particularly since these same employers
noted that in their own experiences they had not observed individuals who met these stereotypes. 173
This is, after all, the principal harm of stereotyping, namely that the group judgments are
exaggerated and overbroad. 174
The main reason to return to language of stereotyping is that courts, including the Supreme
Court, have been relying on claims of stereotyping to prove discrimination cases for at least thirty
years, and they have done so without worrying about whether the underlying stereotypes are
explicit or implicit, or whether they are unconscious in origin. The most famous case that turned
on stereotypes to establish liability is Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, which involved an accountant
who sued when her consideration for partnership was delayed. 175 As recounted in the Supreme
Court decision, several of the Price Waterhouse partners had suggested that the plaintiff, Ann
Hopkins, should go to charm school, should learn to walk and talk more femininely. 176 At the
trial, the plaintiff introduced evidence from a well-known social psychologist who was testifying
as an expert witness that these, and other comments, evinced stereotypes against working women,
who were often held to a double standard in that what was acceptable for men (aggressive
behavior) was deemed unacceptable for women. 177 Importantly, no one in the case asked whether
171
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the stereotypes were unconscious, automatic or uncontrollable, and as one thinks about the
evidence, it seems clear that none of those labels would be appropriate.
Since Price Waterhouse, courts, including the Supreme Court, have become accustomed to
adjudicating discrimination cases based on claims that stereotyping explained the challenged
actions. The Supreme Court has evoked the evils of racial stereotyping in cases involving
peremptory challenges and voting rights cases, 178 It has also relied on stereotypes in addressing
claims under the Family Medical Leave Act concluding that the statute was designed to eradicate
stereotypes against working mothers, 179 and in the age discrimination context where, again, the
Court noted that the age discrimination act was designed to address stereotypes about older
workers. 180 Perhaps most significant, the Court has struck down legislation because it perpetrated
stereotypes against women in a lengthy series of cases. 181 Stereotyping, in other words, has been
an essential part of the Supreme Court’s antidiscrimination doctrine for many years. Importantly,
all of these cases in which the Court has discussed the impermissibility of stereotyping involved
claims of intentional discrimination, most commonly under the Constitution.
Although there is no question that stereotyping has played an important role in the Supreme
Court’s doctrine, issues relating to how stereotyping can be proved, and its relevance to
establishing claims of intentional discrimination, have been developed most extensively in the
lower courts, where there are literally thousands of such cases. To be sure, not all of the cases are
successful, but courts have clearly adapted to claims of stereotyping – in a wide array of contexts
– and again have done so without resorting to determining whether the stereotypes are consciously
invoked. 182 One recent case flatly rejected the notion that there was conscious, explicit
discrimination, as reflected in self-reports, and something else. In Burns v. Johnson, the
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Department of Homeland Security defended a sex discrimination claim by stating that there were
no “sexist or gender-based slurs” used against the plaintiff. 183 In the social psychology literature,
that would be termed explicit bias and the court rejected this dichotomy, explaining:
The idea that discrimination consists only of blatantly sexist acts and remarks
was long ago rejected by the Supreme Court. As this circuit has repeatedly held,
stereotyping cognitive bias, and certain other more subtle cognitive phenomena . .
.also fall within the ambit of Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination.184
Other courts have, likewise, made it clear that the origins of the stereotypes, or the underlying
motive, is simply not relevant to the legal inquiry. In a case involving a challenge to the striking
of an African-American juror, the dissenting judge complained that the prosecutor was being held
responsible for “unconscious bias” whereas the majority countered that, “[W]hy the prosecutor
had a conscious motive to strike [the juror] in the first place – whether or not ‘unconscious racism’
partly explained that motive – was simply irrelevant.” 185 At the end of the day, the question was
whether the evidence demonstrated that race was “a substantial reason for his use of a peremptory
strike.” 186 This is a position that has been reiterated by courts for many years and on many
occasions. 187
Adding implicit bias into the mix is likely to cause more confusion than clarity. Whereas courts
are clearly comfortable in incorporating stereotyping theories into their intentional discrimination
jurisprudence, they become less comfortable doing so when “unconscious bias” is introduced into
the analysis. This is not just because unconscious bias is associated with the distinct disparate
impact theory but also because it can become too difficult to refute a claim of unconscious bias, as
indicated in the earlier discussion relating to the exclusion of expert testimony who claimed that
implicit bias explained most any observed disparity. 188 In other words, turning to implicit bias
will rarely, if ever, help prove a case, but it may lead to having more claims dismissed because of
the difficulty fitting implicit bias within governing legal structures. Thus the paradox with which
I began.
IV. CONCLUSION
Discrimination remains a vibrant force in society and some of it is no doubt the result of
unconscious or implicit bias. At the same, implicit bias does not explain all contemporary
discrimination, and most of the bias that the legal system considers arises from deliberate and
conscious actions. Many of these actions are undoubtedly influenced by automatic stereotyping
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but that does not transform them into unconscious acts that are beyond control. If the message of
the implicit bias literature is that much of contemporary discrimination is not animus-based, that
is a message the legal system learned long ago, and it is a message that does not require an
emphasis on the unconscious. No doubt that literature, including its adaptation by law professors,
has provided an important educational function by demonstrating the complexities of subtle
discrimination but it is now time to return to holding individuals responsible for the choices they
make and can control, Rather than focusing on the unconscious, legal scholars should look to field
studies for evidence of discrimination and return to a focus on how stereotyping continues to
influence thoughts and behavior.
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